Cyber Insights 2023: Ransomware

cyber-insights-2023:-ransomware

About SecurityWeek Cyber Insights | At the end of 2022, SecurityWeek liaised with more than 300 cybersecurity experts from over 100 different organizations to gain insight into the security issues of today – and how these issues might evolve during 2023 and beyond. The result is more than a dozen features on subjects ranging from AI, quantum encryption, and attack surface management to venture capital, regulations, and criminal gangs.

Cyber Insights | 2023

SecurityWeek Cyber Insights 2023 | Ransomware – The key purpose behind cybercriminality is to gain money. Extortion has always been a successful and preferred method to achieve this. Ransomware is merely a means of extortion. Its success is illustrated by the continuous growth of ransomware attacks over many years.

The evolution of ransomware has not been static. Its nature has changed as the criminals have refined the approach to improve the extortion, and the volume (generally upward) has ebbed and flowed in reaction to market conditions. The important point, however, is that criminals are not married to encryption, they are married to extortion.

The changing nature of what we still generally call ransomware will continue through 2023, driven by three primary conditions: the geopolitical influence of the Russia/Ukraine war, the improving professionalism of the criminal gangs, and more forceful attempts by governments and law enforcement agencies to counter the threat.

The cyberwar effect

The Russia/Ukraine war has removed our blinkers. The world has been at covert cyberwar for many years – generally along the accepted geopolitical divide – but it is now more intense and more overt. While the major powers, so far at least, have refrained from open attacks against adversaries’ critical infrastructures, criminal gangs are less concerned.

“The rate of growth in ransomware attacks is currently slowing slightly [late 2022] – but this will prove to be a false dawn,” suggests Mark Warren, product specialist at Osirium. “Currently, the most successful teams of cybercriminals are focused on attacking Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. The second that conflict is over, all the technology, tools and resources will be redeployed back into ransomware attacks – so organizations and nation states alike must not become complacent.”

One of the most likely effects of the European conflict will be an increasingly destructive effect from ransomware. This has already begun and will increase through 2023. “We are seeing an increase in more destructive ransomware attacks at scale and across virtually all sector types, which we expect to continue into 2023,” comments Aamir Lakhani, cybersecurity researcher and practitioner for FortiGuard Labs.

“Ransomware will continue to make headlines, as attacks become more destructive, and threat actors develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures to try and stay one step ahead of vendors,” agrees John McClurg, SVP and CISO at BlackBerry.

“We expect ransomware to continue its assault on businesses in 2023,” says Darren Williams, CEO and founder at BlackFog. “Specifically, we will see a huge shift to data deletion in order to leverage the value of extortion.” 

There are two reasons for this move towards data deletion. Firstly, it is a knock-on effect of the kinetic and associated cyber destruction in Ukraine. But secondly it is the nature of ransomware. Remember that ransomware is merely a means of extortion. The criminals are finding that data extortion is more effective than system extortion via encryption. Andrew Hollister, CISO LogRhythm, explains in more detail:

“In 2023, we’ll see ransomware attacks focusing on corrupting data rather than encrypting it. Data corruption is faster than full encryption and the code is immensely easier to write since you don’t need to deal with complex public-private key handling as well as delivering complex decryption code to reverse the damage once the victim pays up,” he said. 

“Since almost all ransomware operators already engage in double extortion, meaning they exfiltrate the data before encrypting it, the option of corrupting the data rather than going to the effort of encryption has many attractions. If the data is corrupted and the organization has no backup, it puts the ransomware operators in a stronger position because then the organization must either pay up or lose the data.”

It should also be noted that the more destruction the criminal gangs deliver after exfiltrating the data, the more completely they will cover their tracks. This becomes more important in an era of increasing law enforcement focus on disrupting the criminal gangs.

But there is an additional danger that might escape from the current geopolitical situation. Vitaly Kamluk, head of the Asia-Pacific research and analysis team at Kaspersky explains: “Statistically, some of the largest and most impactful cyber epidemics occur every six to seven years. The last such incident was the infamous WannaCry ransomware-worm, leveraging the extremely potent EternalBlue vulnerability to automatically spread to vulnerable machines.” 

Kaspersky researchers believe the likelihood of the next WannaCry happening in 2023 is high. “One potential reason for an event like this occurring,” continued Kamluk, “is that the most sophisticated threat actors in the world are likely to possess at least one suitable exploit, and current global tensions greatly increase the chance that a ShadowBrokers-style hack-and-leak could take place.”

Finally, it is worth mentioning an unexpected effect of the geopolitical situation: splintering and rebranding among the ransomware groups. Most of the larger groups are multi-national – so it should be no surprise that different members might have different geopolitical affiliations. Conti is perhaps the biggest example to date.

“In 2022, many large groups collapsed, including the largest, Conti,” comments Vincent D’Agostino, head of digital forensics and incident response at BlueVoyant. “This group collapsed under the weight of its own public relations nightmare, which sparked internal strife after Conti’s leadership pledged allegiance to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Conti was forced to shut down and rebrand as a result.” Ukrainian members objected and effectively broke away, leaking internal Conti documents at the same time.

But this doesn’t mean that the ransomware threat will diminish. “After the collapses, new and rebranded groups emerged. This is expected to continue as leadership and senior affiliates strike out on their own, retire, or seek to distance themselves from prior reputations,” continued D’Agostino. 

The fracturing of Conti and multiple rebrandings of Darkside into their current incarnations has demonstrated the effectiveness of regular rebranding in shedding unwanted attention. “Should this approach continue to gain popularity, the apparent number of new groups announcing themselves will increase dramatically when in fact many are fragments or composites of old groups.”

Sophistication

The increasing sophistication, or professionalism, of the criminal gangs is discussed in Cyber Insights 2023: Criminal Gangs. Here we will focus on how this affects ransomware.

RaaS

The most obvious is the emergence of ransomware-as-a-service. The elite gangs are finding increased profits and reduced personal exposure by developing the malware and then leasing its use to third-party affiliates for a fee or percentage of returns. Their success has been so great that more, lesser skilled gangs will follow the same path.

“It initially started as an annoyance,” explains Matthew Fulmer, manager of cyber intelligence engineering at Deep Instinct, “but now after years of successful evolution, these gangs operate with more efficiency than many Fortune 500 companies. They’re leaner, meaner, more agile, and we’re going to see even more jump on this bandwagon even if they’re not as advanced as their partners-in-crime.”

The less advanced groups, and all affiliates of RaaS, are likely to suffer at the hands of law enforcement. “It is likely that there will be a constant battle between law enforcement agencies and ransomware affiliates. This will either be veteran/more established ransomware affiliates or new ransomware groups with novel ideas,” comments Beth Allen, senior threat intelligence analyst at Intel 471. 

“Much like whack-a-mole, RaaS groups will surface, conduct attacks, be taken down or have their operations impacted by LEAs – and then go quiet only to resurface in the future. The instability within criminal organizations that we have observed will also be a contributing factor to groups fading and others surfacing to fill the void.”

Changing tactics

As defenders get better at defending against ransomware, the attackers will simply change their tactics. John Pescatore, director of emerging security trends at SANS, gives one example: “Many attackers will choose an easier and less obtrusive path to gain the same critical data. We will see more attacks target backups that are less frequently monitored, can provide ongoing access to data, and may be less secure or from forgotten older files.”

Drew Schmitt, lead analyst at GuidePoint, sees increased use of the methodologies that already work, combined with greater attempts to avoid law enforcement. “Ransomware groups will likely continue to evolve their operations leveraging critical vulnerabilities in commonly used applications, such as Microsoft Exchange, firewall appliances, and other widely used applications,” he suggested. 

“The use of legitimate remote management tools such as Atera, Splashtop, and Syncro is likely to continue to be a viable source of flying under the radar while providing persistent access to threat actors,” he added.

But, he continued, “ransomware ‘rebranding’ is likely to increase exponentially to obfuscate ransomware operations and make it harder for security researchers and defenders to keep up with a blend of tactics.”

Warren expects to see criminal ransomware attacks focusing on smaller, less well-defended organizations. “State actors will still go after large institutions like the NHS, which implement robust defenses; but there are many small to mid-size companies that invest less in protection, have limited technical skills, and find cyberinsurance expensive – all of which makes them easy targets.”

This will partly be an effect of better defenses in larger organizations, and partly because of the influx of less sophisticated ransomware affiliates. “We can expect smaller scale attacks, for lower amounts of money, but which target a much broader base. The trend will probably hit education providers hard: education is already the sector most likely to be targeted,” he continued.

He gives a specific example from the UK. “Every school in the UK is being asked to join a multi-academy trust, where groups of schools will be responsible for themselves. With that change comes great vulnerability. This ‘network’ of schools would be a prime target for ransomware attacks; they are connected, and they’re unlikely to have the resilience or capabilities to protect against attacks. They may have no choice but to reallocate their limited funds to pay ransom demands.”

But it won’t just be more of the same. More professionalized attackers will lead to new attack techniques. Konstantin Zykov, senior security researcher at Kaspersky, gives an example: the use of drones. “Next year, we may see bold attackers become adept at mixing physical and cyber intrusions, employing drones for proximity hacking.”

He described some of the possible attack scenarios, such as, “Mounting drones with sufficient tooling to allow the collection of WPA handshakes used for offline cracking of Wi-Fi passwords or even dropping malicious USB keys in restricted areas in hope that a passerby would pick them up and plug them into a machine.”

Marcus Fowler, CEO of Darktrace Federal, believes the existing ransomware playbook will lead to increased cloud targeting. “Part of this playbook is following the data to maximize RoI. Therefore, as cloud adoption and reliance continue to surge, we are likely to see an increase in cloud-enabled data exfiltration in ransomware scenarios in lieu of encryption,” he said. “Third-party supply chains offer those with criminal intent more places to hide, and targeting cloud providers instead of a single organization gives attackers more bang for their buck.”

Evasion and persistence are other traits that will expand through 2023. “We continue to see an emergence in techniques that can evade typical security stacks, like HEAT (Highly Evasive Adaptive Threats) attacks,” says Mark Guntrip, senior director of cybersecurity strategy at Menlo. “These tactics are not only are tricking traditional corporate security measures but they’re also becoming more successful in luring employees into their traps as they identify ways to appear more legitimate by delivering ransomware via less suspecting ways – like through browsers.”

Persistence, that is, a lengthy dwell time, will also increase in 2023. “Rather than blatantly threatening organizations, threat actors will begin leveraging more discreet techniques to make a profit,” comments JP Perez-Etchegoyen, CTO at Onapsis. “Threat groups like Elephant Beetle have proven that cybercriminals can enter business-critical applications and remain undetected for months, even years, while silently siphoning off tens of millions of dollars.”

David Anteliz, senior technical director at Skybox, makes a specific persistence prediction for 2023: “In 2023, we predict a major threat group will be discovered to have been dwelling in the network of a Fortune 500 company for months, if not years, siphoning emails and accessing critical data without a trace. The organizations will only discover their data has been accessed when threat groups threaten to take sensitive information to the dark web.”

Fighting ransomware in 2023

The effect of ransomware and its derivatives will continue to get worse before it gets better. Apart from the increasing sophistication of existing gangs, there is a new major threat – the worsening economic conditions that will have a global impact in 2023. 

Firstly, a high number of cyber competent people will be laid off as organizations seek to reduce their staffing costs. These people will still need to make a living for themselves and their families – and from this larger pool, a higher than usual number of otherwise law-abiding people may be tempted by the easy route offered by RaaS. This alone could lead to increased levels of ransomware attacks by new wannabe criminals.

Secondly, companies will be tempted to reduce their security budgets on top of the reduced staffing levels. “Once rumblings of economic uncertainty begin, wary CFOs will begin searching for areas of superfluous spending to cut in order to keep their company ahead of the game,” warns Jadee Hanson, CIO and CISO at Code42. “For the uninformed C-suite, cybersecurity spend is sometimes seen as an added expense rather than an essential business function that helps protect the company’s reputation and bottom line.”

She is concerned that this could happen during a period of increasing ransomware attacks. “These organizations may try to cut spending by decreasing their investment in cybersecurity tools or talent – effectively lowering their company’s ability to properly detect or prevent data breaches and opening them up to potentially disastrous outcomes.”

One approach, advocated by Bec McKeown, director of human science at Immersive Labs, is to treat remaining staff as human firewalls. “I believe that 2023 will be the year when enterprises recognize that they are only as secure and resilient as their people – not their technologies,” she says. “Only by supporting initiatives that prioritize well-being, learning and development, and regular crisis exercising can organizations better prepare for the future.”

Done correctly, she believes this can be achieved in a resource- and cost-effective manner. “Adopting a psychological approach to human-driven responses during a crisis – like a cybersecurity breach – will ensure that organizations fare far better in the long run.”

But perhaps the most dramatic response to ransomware will need to come from governments, although law enforcement agencies alone won’t cut it. LEAs may know the perpetrators but will not be able to prosecute criminals ‘protected’ by adversary nations. LEAs may be able to take down criminal infrastructures, but the gangs will simply move to new infrastructures. The effectively bullet-proof hosting provided by the Interplanetary File System (IPFS), for example, will increasingly be abused by cybercriminals.

The only thing that will stop ransomware/extortion will be the prevention of its profitability – if the criminals don’t make a profit, they’ll stop doing it and try something different. But it’s not that easy. At the close of 2022, following major incidents at Optus and Medibank, Australia is considering making ransom payments illegal – but the difficulties are already apparent.

As ransomware becomes more destructive, paying or not paying may become existential. This will encourage companies to deny attacks, which will leave the victims of stolen PII unknowingly at risk. And any sectors exempted from a ban will have a large target on their back.

While many foreign governments are known to be, or have been, considering a ban on ransom payments, this is unlikely to happen in the US. In a very partisan political era, the strength of the Republican party – with its philosophy of minimal government interference in business – will make it impossible.

In the end, it’s down to each of us…

Ultimately, beating ransomware will be down to individual organizations’ own cyber defenses – and this will be harder than ever in 2023. “There’s no letup in sight,” comments Sam Curry, CSO at Cybereason. “Ransomware continues to target all verticals and geographies, and new ransomware cartels are popping up all the time. The biggest frustration is that it is a soluble problem.”

He believes there are ways to stop the delivery of the malware, and there are ways to prevent its execution. “There are ways to prepare in peacetime and not panic in the moment, but most companies aren’t doing this. Saddest of all is the lack of preparation at the bottom of the pyramid in smaller businesses and below the security poverty line. Victims can’t pay to make the problem go away. When they do, they get hit repeatedly for having done so. The attackers know that the risk equation hasn’t changed between one attack and the next, nor have the defenses.”

Related: It Doesn’t Pay to Pay: Study Finds 80% of Ransomware Victims Attacked Again

Related: New Zealand Government Hit by Ransomware Attack on IT Provider

Related: Ransomware, Malware-as-a-Service Dominate Threat Landscape

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Malicious NPM, PyPI Packages Stealing User Information

malicious-npm,-pypi-packages-stealing-user-information

Check Point and Phylum are warning of recently identified NPM and PyPI packages designed to steal user information and download additional payloads.

Taking advantage of the broad use of open source code in application development, malicious actors are increasingly relying on software supply chain attacks to infect both developers and users with malware.

According to an October 2022 Sonatype report, the number of software supply chain attacks observed in 2022 was 633% higher compared to the previous year.

Node.js (NPM) and Python (PyPI) repositories are the preferred targets for malicious packages, mainly because code execution can be triggered during package installation, Check Point notes.

In a new report, the cybersecurity firm says it has identified two malicious Python packages that fit this description.

The first of them, Python-drgn, was uploaded to PyPI on August 8, 2022. Relying on typo-squatting, the package is meant to attract users who are looking for Drgn, a debugger with an emphasis on programmability.

The malicious package consists of a single setup.py file, which automatically runs during package installation and which contains malware. When executed, the malware stores the username, the working directory’s path, and networking information, and sends it to a remote, private Slack channel.

The second malicious package is named bloxflip, typosquatting the Bloxflip.py package, which is an API wrapper for bloxflip.com.

The malicious code within bloxflip disables Windows Defender to prevent detection, then fetches an executable from a remote server, creates a subprocess, and executes the malicious payload.

Phylum, on the other hand, says it has discovered over 100 malicious NPM packages that contain the payload in package.json’s postinstall script, which is executed during package installation.

The malicious script harvests various types of information from the infected system (including hostname, username, working directory, and package name and version) and sends it to an attacker-controlled server.

The software supply chain security firm also observed the package authors changing the remote server address over the course of 24 hours.

“Code package supply chain attacks, in which attackers publish malicious packages or inject malicious code into legitimate code packages distributed through online code repositories and package managers, have increased significantly in recent years. These attacks can have serious consequences, including data compromise, operational disruption, and reputation damage,” Check Point concludes.

Related: PyPI Users Targeted With ‘Wacatac’ Trojan in New Supply Chain Attack

Related: Malware Delivered to PyTorch Users in Supply Chain Attack

Related: Hundreds Infected With ‘Wasp’ Stealer in Ongoing Supply Chain Attack

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Stop, Collaborate and Listen: Disrupting Cybercrime Networks Requires Private-Public Cooperation and Information Sharing

stop,-collaborate-and-listen:-disrupting-cybercrime-networks-requires-private-public-cooperation-and-information-sharing

As we reflect on 2022, we’ve seen that malicious actors are constantly coming up with new ways to weaponize technologies at scale to cause more disruption and devastation.

The dangers are showing up everywhere – and more frequently. The volume and variety of threats, including Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and novel attacks on previously less conventional targets, are of particular concern to CIOs and CISOs.

Increasingly, cybercrime is big business run by highly organized groups rather than individuals. Much like the mythological hydra, cutting off the head of one of these organizations (i.e. just stopping a few low level operators in their tracks) isn’t going to solve the problem; the key is to disrupt the networks themselves. That’s a tall order – one that’s going to require widespread collaboration.

Cybercrime networks and Cybercrime-as-a-Service

We anticipated that in 2022 there would be an increase in pre-attack reconnaissance and weaponization among attackers. This would open the door for the growth of Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS) to accelerate even faster.

That prediction of cybercrime proved to be accurate. The FortiGuard Labs team documented 10,666 new ransomware variations in the first half 2022 compared to just 5,400 in the second half of 2021. That’s an almost 100% increase in the number of new ransomware variants found. The rise in popularity of RaaS on the dark web is the main cause of this sudden increase of new ransomware strains.

RaaS is mostly to blame for the explosive growth in ransomware variants, and ransomware payments are also rising. U.S. financial institutions spent close to $1.2 billion on likely ransomware payments in 2021, according to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury. That was more than double the prior year, and if that trend continues, results from 2022 will be even higher.

Our current predictions indicate that the CaaS market will grow dramatically through 2023 and beyond, with threat actors soon being able to subscribe to new exploits, services and structured programs.

We’re also predicting that threat actors will soon have access to more readymade, “as a service” products. This means even more cybercriminals of all levels will be able to launch more complex attacks without first devoting time and money to creating their own strategy. Additionally, producing and offering “aaS” attack portfolios is a straightforward, efficient, and repeatable way for seasoned hackers to make money, meaning the business model pays. Prepare yourself for an enhanced CaaS catalog to appear in 2023 and beyond as a result.

Collaboration is key

It can’t be emphasized enough: the key to disrupting cybercrime networks is collaboration across the private and public sector. One illustration is what the World Economic Forum’s Partnership Against Cybercrime is doing (PAC). In response to the pandemic’s unparalleled and exponential development in cybercriminal activity, PAC has concentrated on fusing the digital know-how and data of the business sector with the threat information of the government sector to help disrupt cybercrime ecosystems.

It will be simpler to overcome the restrictions that protect hackers if a worldwide strategy and coordinated effort are used to remove communication barriers. It is everyone’s duty to disrupt bad actors and destroy the attack infrastructure, and this calls for solid, reliable partnerships with other organizations. Cybercriminals run their operations like businesses; therefore, the more we can make them rebuild, change their strategies, and start over, the better off digital assets will be.

Not only do we want to stop attacks from happening, but we also want to take down cybercriminals and make them modify how they operate, which costs them effort, time and resources. Sharing actionable threat intelligence among organizations and influencing how cyberthreat mitigation will be done in the future are crucial.

Private-public collaboration in practice  

An example of how this kind of collaboration can be used to disrupt cybercrime networks is the recent African Cyber Surge Operation. The collaboration between INTERPOL, FortiGuard Labs and other INTERPOL private partners resulted in the successful Cyber Surge operation and the dissemination of intel to several law enforcement organizations in the Africa region.

Partners such as FortiGuard Labs offered actionable threat intelligence based on infrastructure research of malware, botnets and command and control (C2), including C2 and malware victims across Africa. The Africa Cyber Surge Operation, which began in July 2022, has brought together law enforcement (LE) officers from 27 nations. They collaborated for almost four months on actionable intelligence provided by INTERPOL private partners.

Through a coordinated effort between INTERPOL, AFRIPOL and the participating nations, this operation targeted both cybercriminals and compromised network infrastructure in Africa. Member nations were able to identify more than 1,000 malicious IP addresses, dark web marketplaces and specific attackers.

The Africa Cyber Surge Operation is a great example of how joint operations and sharing threat intelligence on threat actors among reliable partners can increase an entire region’s cyber resilience. It also demonstrates the need of cybersecurity education and training in bridging the cyberskills gap and effectively combating cybercrime on a large scale.

Collaboration is the key

No one combatting cybercrime knows everything, but everyone in the battle has some intelligence to contribute to the larger knowledge base. Just as cybercrime networks are getting stronger and larger, so too must collaborative strategies between private companies and law enforcement agencies. Disrupting cybercrime networks is going to take collaboration on a large scale.

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Prilex PoS Malware Blocks NFC Transactions to Steal Credit Card Data

prilex-pos-malware-blocks-nfc-transactions-to-steal-credit-card-data

The point-of-sale (PoS) malware named Prilex has been modified to block contactless transactions in an effort to force users to insert their credit cards into terminals and steal their information.

Initially detailed in 2017, Prilex has evolved from targeting ATMs into an advanced PoS malware that can perform a broad range of nefarious activities leading to credit card fraud.

Unlike other memory scrapers typically seen in attacks targeting PoS terminals, Prilex can perform real-time patching on targeted software, force protocol downgrades, manipulate cryptograms, and perform GHOST attacks, and also uses a unique cryptographic scheme.

Also capable of performing fraud on cards protected by chip-and-PIN technology, the latest Prilex versions can now capture data from contactless (NFC enabled) cards, Kaspersky has discovered.

Contactless payment systems rely on radio-frequency identification (RFID) or near-field communication (NFC) technology integrated into cards, mobile devices, key fobs, wearables, and other devices, allowing individuals to make secure payments by simply waving their card or mobile device over the PoS terminal.

When the card is placed near, the contactless-enabled payment terminal sends a signal to activate the RFID chip embedded in the card, which in turn responds with a unique identification number (ID) and transaction information.

This transaction information cannot be reused, so it is useless to cybercriminals who capture it.

To overcome this inconvenience, Prilex’ developers updated the malware with code that blocks contactless transactions, which results in the terminal prompting the buyer to insert their credit card in the device.

“The goal here is to force the victim to use their physical card by inserting it into the PIN pad reader, so the malware will be able to capture the data coming from the transaction,” Kaspersky notes.

The code was found in Prilex samples that emerged at the end of 2022, and which can also filter cards according to segment, such as to only block a contactless transaction and to capture the card information if the card is in a tier with a high transaction limit.

“Since transaction data generated during a contactless payment are useless from a cybercriminal’s perspective, it is understandable that Prilex needs to force victims to insert the card into the infected PoS terminal. While the group is looking for a way to commit fraud with unique credit card numbers, this clever trick allows it to continue operating,” Kaspersky concludes.

Related: PyPI Users Targeted With PoweRAT Malware

Related: Self-Replicating Malware Used by Chinese Cyberspies Spreads via USB Drives

Related: Omron PLC Vulnerability Exploited by Sophisticated ICS Malware

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Cyber Insights 2023: Criminal Gangs

cyber-insights-2023:-criminal-gangs

About SecurityWeek Cyber Insights | At the end of 2022, SecurityWeek liaised with more than 300 cybersecurity experts from over 100 different organizations to gain insight into the security issues of today – and how these issues might evolve during 2023 and beyond. The result is more than a dozen features on subjects ranging from AI, quantum encryption, and attack surface management to venture capital, regulations, and criminal gangs.

Cyber Insights | 2023

Our intention here is to talk about cybercrime and cybercriminals. Despite some geopolitical overlaps with state attackers, the majority of cyberattacks still come from simple – or perhaps sophisticated – criminals who are more motivated by money than politics.

“With the Russia-Ukraine War, many actors polarized, including players like Conti, Killnet and Anonymous. However, the ecosystem is much larger, and even with setbacks in cryptocurrency brokerage, which advanced the liquidity and economics of criminals online, criminal organizations are thriving, diversifying, and going gangbusters as we enter 2023,” comments Sam Curry, CSO at Cybereason.

“There are no signs of this letting up and all signs indicate that criminal organizations’ real growth is e-crime going forward.”

Know your enemy

An increasing sophistication among the more elite criminals together with a more streamlined organization of the infrastructure from which they operate has been apparent for many years. This process continues and will continue throughout 2023. It is apparent in both how the gangs operate and the tools they use.

“Malware will continue to evolve in 2023 as attackers find new ways to hide it to maintain persistence and get what they came for,” says Mike Parkin, senior technical engineer at Vulcan Cyber – adding, “The attack vectors they use to get a foothold will also evolve, taking advantage of new vulnerabilities, and leveraging variations of old ones.”

But it is the increasing maturity of the criminal business that perhaps poses the greatest threat. “There is a significant maturing of the tools used by cybercriminal groups,” explains Andrew Barratt, VP at Coalfire. “They are becoming platforms (as a service) for other criminal groups with significantly less technical expertise to leverage.”

We’ve had ransomware-as-a-service and infostealers-as-a-service for a few years, but it is becoming more accurate to describe the process as a complete ‘crime-as-a-service’. “While we’ve seen the crime-as-a-service infrastructure become very prevalent, it’s probably likely we’ll see an uptick in volume and/or pricing of these attacks in the year ahead,” adds Barratt.

Crime-as-a-Service

“We’ve looked at numerous online forums and found such a rise and diversification in the many kinds of criminal ‘as a service’ offerings that people really can set up their own cybercrime business with little to no technical knowledge or skills,” explains Christopher Budd, senior manager of threat research at Sophos. 

“Now you can find a vendor or supplier to cover your needs around targeting and initial compromise of victims, evasion and operational security, and malware delivery, among others.” These offerings often come with good marketing and customer service and support that meets – or even exceeds – those you get when paying for legitimate software.

Andrew Pendergast
Andrew Pendergast

Calling it malware-as-a-service (MaaS) rather than crime-as-a-service, Andrew Pendergast, EVP of product at ThreatConnect, adds, “MaaS operators act like a business, because they are a business – just an illegal one. Their goals are to make as much money as possible selling their product and services. This entails making it as accessible, trustable, reliable, and easy to use as possible for their ‘market’.”

He expects the CaaS providers to continue to improve their support and services to accommodate a broader set of customers and affiliates, adding, “The net results will be a broadening user base for various MaaS offerings which in 2023 likely means more ransomware attacks.”

In fact, the service is now so complete that Benjamin Fabre, CEO at DataDome, points out new cybercriminals no longer need the technical skills to develop and execute cyberattacks on their own. “Cybercrime will require as much brains as holding a baseball bat to a shop owner’s window,” he comments.

Chris Vaughan, a VP of technical account management at Tanium, agrees with this assessment. “Malicious cyber tools are becoming more available to be purchased online which is leading to a greater number of attacks that are also less predictable. This includes vulnerabilities and exploits as well as hackers for hire, dramatically lowering the barrier of entry for anyone interested in launching a cyberattack.”

This leads us to another related concern for 2023: the potential. expansion of a recession-promoted cybercrime gig economy. “People may turn to ‘cyber hustling’ in the cybercrime gig economy to make quick cash during the economic downturn,” warns Alex Holland, senior malware analyst at HP Inc.

He fears a potential increase in the number of cyber hustlers seeking to make additional – or, indeed, any – income by scamming consumers who will themselves be looking for opportunities to raise some extra cash. “Cybercrime tools and mentoring services are readily available at low costs, enticing cyber hustlers – opportunists with relatively low levels of technical skill – to access what they need to turn a profit.”

The interconnected nature of the cybercrime gig economy means threat actors can easily monetize attacks. “And if they strike gold and compromise a corporate device, they can also sell that access to bigger players, like ransomware gangs. This all feeds into the cybercrime engine, giving organized groups even more reach.”

Crime gang career roles

John Bambenek

Fundamental to the emergence of streamlined CaaS has been the evolution of career specializations within the gangs. “In many ways, the cybercrime ecosystem has developed specialized ‘career fields’ in a similar way that cybersecurity has developed specializations,” comments John Bambenek, principal threat hunter at Netenrich. 

This means there are many more partnerships and boutique actors helping a variety of groups. “Getting initial access is a specialized skill set, just like money laundering (in cryptocurrency) and ransomware development are skill sets,” he added. “This specialization makes the ecosystem as a whole more resilient and more difficult to bring to justice.”

This process of business refinement will continue through 2023. “Criminal organizations will continue to grow in scope and capabilities, with increased focus on functional areas,” suggests Gray, AVP of security strategy at Deepwatch. “Specialization will allow these groups to maintain the razor margins needed to operate at levels that are capable of bypassing security program components at advanced targets and/or operate at scale against more susceptible targets.”

Three categories of CaaS to watch in 2023

Three categories of crime-as-a-service are likely to be prevalent in 2023: ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), stealer-as-a-service (SaaS), and victims-as-a-service (VaaS).

RaaS

The ‘pay-per-use’ version of delivering ransomware is, says, Camellia Chan, CEO and founder of X-Phy, “a sophisticated, and yet much more accessible form of ransomware, with malicious actors no longer requiring advanced technical skills to carry out attacks.” This is a win for wannabe criminals who cannot code. 

But it is also a win for the more elite coding criminals trying to avoid the eye of law enforcement. “The number of different entities involved adds another layer of complexity,” explains Chan. “While RaaS operators develop the infrastructure, access brokers focus on the identity posture and external access portals. To finish, the affiliate buying the RaaS handles the exfiltration of data to ransom, then deploying the actual ransomware payload.”

Mike McLellan, director of intelligence at Secureworks, continues: “New RaaS schemes will continue to emerge, but the landscape will be dominated by a handful of cybercriminal groups operating a small number of very active schemes.”

He expects the dominant schemes to increase their capacity to support more affiliates. “Experienced cybercriminals under sanction by the U.S. authorities will make use of existing RaaS schemes as a way of complicating attribution of their attacks. At the other end of the spectrum, less sophisticated affiliates will conduct simplistic ransomware deployments against small numbers of hosts, rather than full blown, enterprise-wide encryption events.”

SaaS

A study published by Group-IB on November 23, 2022, reported that 34 Russian-speaking groups were distributing infostealers as part of stealers-as-a-service operations. On average, each of these groups has some 200 active members. 

Twenty-three of the groups distributed the Redline infostealer, while eight concentrated on Raccoon. “An infostealer,” explains Group-IB, “is a type of malware that collects credentials stored in browsers (including gaming accounts, email services, and social media), bank card details, and crypto wallet information from infected computers, and then sends all this data to the malware operator.”

Given that credentials remain the starting point for most cyberattacks, the demand is and will remain high. Group-IB suggests “Stealers are one of the top threats to watch in the coming year.” The company notes, “In the first seven months of 2022, the gangs collectively infected over 890,000 user devices and stole over 50 million passwords.”

While the targets are individual computers often used by gamers and remote workers, the potential knock-on effect against corporates should not be under-estimated. “The threat actor responsible for the most recent attack on Uber purchased the credentials compromised with the Raccoon stealer,” says Group-IB.

Uber itself explained the process in a statement: “An Uber EXT contractor had their account compromised by an attacker. It is likely that the attacker purchased the contractor’s Uber corporate password on the dark web, after the contractor’s personal device had been infected with malware, exposing those credentials. The attacker then repeatedly tried to log in to the contractor’s Uber account. Each time, the contractor received a two-factor login approval request, which initially blocked access. Eventually, however, the contractor accepted one, and the attacker successfully logged in.”

This demonstrates both the success of stealers and the failure of MFA to offer a complete access solution. The Uber instance seems to be a variation on what Tanium’s Vaughan describes as an MFA push exhaustion attack. “This,” he explains, “is where an attacker sends a large number of MFA acceptance prompts to a user’s phone which may cause them to click accept in order to stop the barrage of requests.”

This whole process of SaaS-delivered stealers acquiring credentials and attackers defeating MFA will persist and increase in 2023.

VaaS

Mark Warren, product specialist at Osirium, believes there is a new service offering on the rise: hacker teams offering victims-as-a-service. “For the last couple of years, threat actors have been team-based,” he explains. “Before cryptocurrency, they were lone wolves – or, occasionally, a loosely connected group who’d met online. Then they started working in teams, and because they were paid money those teams became tightly bonded. Over the next year we’ll see more teams divide out into skills-based groups.”

He uses REvil as an example of a successful RaaS model offering an end-to-end solution for attackers that included encryption software, access tools, helpdesks for victims, payment services and much more.  “But,” he says, “there’s still a market for smaller teams that focus on specific attack skills. For example, they may breach defenses to acquire user or admin credentials, or even install malware to provide back door entry for use at a later date.” 

Providers of such a service don’t need to take the risk of executing the attack or handling payment; they can make good money just by selling the access on dark web marketplaces. The access could be obtained via relatively risk-free phishing campaigns.

The approach could be modular. “Company intelligence may be another specialist service,” he suggests. “For example, knowing what cyber insurance a potential victim has could reveal the kinds of defenses they’ll have in place and even how much they’re insured for, so ransomware demands can be tailored.” In this sense, VaaS can be seen as an extension and expansion of the existing access broker criminal service.

And going forward…

Aamir Lakhani, cybersecurity researcher and practitioner for Fortinet’s FortiGuard Labs, adds further subtleties that will emerge. “Going forward, subscription based CaaS offerings could potentially provide additional revenue streams. In addition, threat actors will also begin to leverage emerging attack vectors such as deepfakes, offering these videos and audio recordings and related algorithms more broadly for purchase.”

The quasi-APT

This continuing professionalization of the criminal fraternity is causing the inevitable emergence of what Omer Carmi, VP of cyber threat intelligence at Cybersixgill, calls the quasi-APT. “In 2023,” he warns, “the quasi-APT’s emergence will escalate due to the democratization of cyberweapons and the democratization of access enabled by powerful technology now accessible to the cybercrime underground.” 

The growth of specialized roles and CaaS means that for as little as $10, threat actors can purchase access and gain a steady foothold into their targets’ systems. They can get a beachhead into highly secured organizations without having to bother with the complex, drawn-out process of gaining initial access on their own. 

“By outsourcing access, attackers of all levels of sophistication can leapfrog several steps, jumping yet another step closer to the level of an APT – hence the birth of the quasi-APT,” he warns.

The constantly improving sophistication and professionalization of the criminal underground will continue through 2023 and beyond. For example, Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at WithSecure, sees artificial intelligence adding a new string to the criminal bow in 2023.

“Malware campaigns will move from human speed to machine speed,” he warns. “The most capable cybercrime groups will reach the capability to use simple machine learning techniques to automate the deployment and operation of malware campaigns, including automatic reaction to our defenses. Malware automation will include techniques like rewriting malicious emails, registering and creating malicious websites, and rewriting and compiling malware code to avoid detection.”

2023 may see the beginning of a new crime gang service: AI-as-a-Service.

About SecurityWeek Cyber Insights | At the end of 2022, SecurityWeek liaised with more than 300 cybersecurity experts from over 100 different organizations to gain insight into the security issues of today – and how these issues might evolve during 2023 and beyond. The result is more than a dozen features on subjects ranging from AI, quantum encryption, and attack surface management to venture capital, regulations, and criminal gangs.

Cyber Insights | 2023

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Russia-Linked APT29 Uses New Malware in Embassy Attacks

russia-linked-apt29-uses-new-malware-in-embassy-attacks

Russia-linked cyberespionage group APT29 has been observed staging new malware for attacks likely targeting embassy-related individuals, Recorded Future reports.

Also referred to as Cozy Bear, the Dukes, Nobelium, and Yttrium, APT29 is a Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group believed to be sponsored by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). It’s also believed to have orchestrated multiple high-profile attacks, including the 2020 SolarWinds attack.

In October 2022, Recorded Future identified new infrastructure and malware that the cyberespionage group likely set up for attacks targeting embassy staff or an ambassador.

A compromised site containing the text “Ambassador’s schedule November 2022” was used as a lure to infect visitors with new malware called GraphicalNeutrino.

The threat, which uses the US-based business automation service Notion for command and control (C&C), is a loader that packs numerous anti-analysis capabilities, including sandbox evasion, API unhooking, and string encryption.

According to Recorded Future, which tracks the activity as BlueBravo (PDF), the staging and deployment of the malware is similar to previously observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) attributed to APT29.

The lure webpage contained within HTML code an obfuscated ZIP file set to be automatically downloaded on the visitors’ system, showing overlaps with previous observed deployment of the EnvyScout dropper.

The ZIP file contains two DLLs and a benign executable masquerading as a PDF, which was designed to load the libraries using DLL search order hijacking. One of the DLLs contains the GraphicalNeutrino malware, implemented in a thread spawned when the library is initialized.

When launched, GraphicalNeutrino attempts to remove API hooks from specific modules, checks whether persistence is required (which it achieves by creating a new registry key), and then establishes communication with the C&C.

The malware creates a unique identifier for the victim, based on username and computer name, adds the ItIEQ prefix to it, and then uses a Notion API database query filter to determine whether the victim has previously connected to the C&C.

A second, nearly identical GraphicalNeutrino sample that Recorded Future identified and which was compiled only two days after the first, contained only small changes, such as a different Notion database ID, a new identifier prefix, a new key for string decryption, a renamed DLL export function, and modified wait time for C&C communication.

“While we are unable to assess the intended targets of this operation based on the data available, it is likely that ambassadorial or embassy-themed lures are particularly effective during periods of heightened geopolitical tensions, such as is the case with the ongoing war in Ukraine. During such periods, Russian APT groups are highly likely to make extensive use of diplomatically themed lures,” Recorded Future notes.

Related: Analysis of Russian Cyberspy Attacks Leads to Discovery of Windows Vulnerability

Related: Russian Cyberspies Targeting Ukraine Pose as Telecoms Providers

Related: Microsoft Details New Post-Compromise Malware Used by Russian Cyberspies

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US Government Agencies Warn of Malicious Use of Remote Management Software

us-government-agencies-warn-of-malicious-use-of-remote-management-software

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are warning organizations of malicious attacks using legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software.

IT service providers use RMM applications to remotely manage their clients’ networks and endpoints, but threat actors are abusing these tools to gain unauthorized access to victim environments and perform nefarious activities.

In malicious campaigns observed in 2022, threat actors sent phishing emails to deploy legitimate RMM software such as ConnectWise Control (previously ScreenConnect) and AnyDesk on victims’ systems, and abuse these for financial gain.

The observed attacks focused on stealing money from bank accounts, but CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC warn that the attackers could abuse RMM tools as backdoors to victim networks and could sell the obtained persistent access to other cybercriminals or to advanced persistent threat (APT) actors.

Last year, multiple federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) employees were targeted with help desk-themed phishing emails, both via personal and government email addresses.

Links included in these messages directed the victims to a first-stage malicious domain, which automatically triggered the download of an executable designed to connect to a second-stage domain and download RMM software from it, as portable executables that would connect to attacker-controlled servers.

“Using portable executables of RMM software provides a way for actors to establish local user access without the need for administrative privilege and full software installation—effectively bypassing common software controls and risk management assumptions,” the US government agencies warn.

In some cases, the email’s recipient was prompted to call the attackers, who then attempted to convince them to visit the malicious domain.

In October 2022, Silent Push uncovered similar malicious typosquatting activity, in which the adversaries impersonated brands such as Amazon, Geek Squad, McAfee, Microsoft, Norton, and PayPal to distribute the remote monitoring tool WinDesk.Client.exe.

In the attacks targeting federal agencies, the threat actors used the RMM tools to connect to the recipient’s system, then entice them to log into their bank account.

The attackers used the unauthorized access to modify the victim’s bank account summary to show that a large amount of money had been mistakenly refunded, instructing the individual to send the amount back to the scam operator.

“Although this specific activity appears to be financially motivated and targets individuals, the access could lead to additional malicious activity against the recipient’s organization—from both other cybercriminals and APT actors,” CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC note.

The agencies underline that any legitimate RMM software could be abused for nefarious purposes, that the use of portable executables allows attackers to bypass existing policies and protections, that antivirus defenses would not be typically triggered by legitimate software, and that RMM tools provide attackers with persistent backdoor access to an environment, without the use of custom malware.

CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC also warn that the legitimate users of RMM software, such as managed service providers (MSPs) and IT help desks, are often targeted by cybercriminals looking to gain access to a large number of the victim MSP’s customers, which could lead to cyberespionage or to the deployment of ransomware and other types of malware.

To stay protected, organizations are advised to implement phishing protections, audit remote access tools, review logs to identify the abnormal use of RMM software, use security software to detect the in-memory execution of RMM software, implementing proper application control policies, restrict the use of RMM software from within the local network, and train employees on phishing.

Related: CISA Updates Infrastructure Resilience Planning Framework

Related: NSA, CISA Explain How Threat Actors Plan and Execute Attacks on ICS/OT

Related: NSA Publishes Best Practices for Improving Network Defenses

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Chinese Hackers Adopting Open Source ‘SparkRAT’ Tool

chinese-hackers-adopting-open-source-‘sparkrat’-tool

A Chinese threat actor tracked as DragonSpark has been using the SparkRAT open source remote administration tool (RAT) in recent attacks targeting East Asian organizations, cybersecurity firm SentinelOne reports.

Relatively new, SparkRAT is a multi-platform RAT written in Golang that can run on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, and which can update itself with new versions available through its command and control (C&C) server.

The threat uses the WebSocket protocol to communicate with the C&C server and includes support for over 20 commands that allow it to execute tasks, control the infected machine, manipulate processes and files, and steal various types of information.

The malware appears to be used by multiple adversaries but, according to SentinelOne, DragonSpark represents the first cluster of activity where SparkRAT has been constantly deployed in attacks.

The attackers were also seen using the China Chopper webshell, along with other malware tools created by Chinese developers, including BadPotato, GotoHTTP, SharpToken, and XZB-1248, as well as two custom malware families, ShellCode_Loader and m6699.exe.

The m6699.exe malware uses Golang source code interpretation to evade detection, where the Yaegi framework is used “to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled”, SentinelOne says.

DragonSpark was seen targeting web servers and MySQL database servers for initial compromise and then performing lateral movement, escalating privileges, and deploying additional malware hosted on attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The cybersecurity firm has observed DragonSpark abusing compromised infrastructure of legitimate organizations in Taiwan, including an art gallery, a baby products retailer, and games and gambling websites, for malware staging.

DragonSpark also uses malware staging infrastructure in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, while its C&C servers are located in Hong Kong and the US.

Based on the infrastructure and tools, SentinelOne assesses that DragonSpark is a Chinese-speaking adversary, focused either on espionage or cybercrime – one of their C&C IPs was previously linked to the Zegost malware, an information stealer used by Chinese threat actors.

“The threat actor behind DragonSpark used the China Chopper webshell to deploy malware. China Chopper has historically been consistently used by Chinese cybercriminals and espionage groups […]. Further, all of the open source tools used by the threat actor conducting DragonSpark attacks are developed by Chinese-speaking developers,” SentinelOne notes.

Related: Chinese Hackers Exploited Fortinet VPN Vulnerability as Zero-Day

Related: Chinese Cyberspies Targeted Japanese Political Entities Ahead of Elections

Related: Self-Replicating Malware Used by Chinese Cyberspies Spreads via USB Drives

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Microsoft Office to Block XLL Add-ins From Internet

microsoft-office-to-block-xll-add-ins-from-internet

Microsoft is getting ready to improve the protection of Office users by automatically blocking more content sourced from the internet.

Building on previous restrictions that applied to macros in Word and Excel documents, the company is now preparing to block XLL add-ins in Excel files.

XLL add-ins are dynamic link library (DLL) files written in C or C++, and which can only be opened in Excel.

Over the past several years, threat actors have been abusing XLL files for the distribution of malware, typically in phishing campaigns that either deliver the XLL as an attachment, or direct the intended victims to malicious websites from where the XLL is automatically downloaded.

“In order to combat the increasing number of malware attacks in recent months, we are implementing measures that will block XLL add-ins coming from the internet,” the latest entry in the Microsoft 365 roadmap reads.

For the time being, the feature is only in development, with intended worldwide general availability set for March 2023.

The blocking of XLL add-ins is the latest step Microsoft is taking towards preventing the use of malicious Office documents for the delivery of malware and for other malicious purposes.

For years, Office documents downloaded from the internet have been automatically opened in Protected View, with a yellow notification being displayed at the top of the document warning users not to trust internet-sourced files.

However, an ‘Enable editing’ button on the notification allows users to exit Protected View and edit the document’s content, but which also results in any macro code included in the file being automatically executed.

To further strengthen the security of its users, Microsoft last year announced that the yellow notification for documents coming from unknown or untrusted sources is being replaced with a red warning that does not allow users to enable macros with a single click. The company also started restricting all Excel 4.0 (XLM) macros by default.

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